Friday, November 15, 2013

Day of the Seafarer 2013

Day of the Seafarer 2013

June 25th, 2013, marked the third
International Day of the Seafarer, an official
United Nations observance day. This year,
IMO celebrated the occasion with a social
media campaign calling on all supply-
chain partners, including those beyond
the maritime sector, to help highlight the
sheer diversity and scale of products used
in everyday life that travel by sea, and to
recognize the importance of the people
that deliver them; more than 1.5 million
seafarers.
In his annual Day of the Seafarer
message, IMO Secretary-General Koji
Sekimizu said, “Seafarers operate on the
‘front line’ of the shipping industry
this year’s campaign theme, Faces of the
Sea, aims to highlight the individuals that
are often unseen, but who work to deliver
more than 90% of the world’s goods. We
will ask the seafarers themselves to show
us snapshots of their daily life at sea, to
give them a voice and share their story on a
global stage, via social media”.
Mr. Sekimizu noted that 2013 is a
landmark year for the seafaring community,
as the Maritime Labour Convention
(MLC 2006) entered into force in August.
“This marks significant progress in the
recognition of seafarers’ roles and the need
to safeguard their well-being and working
conditions,” he said.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
also highlighted the Day of the Seafarer,
with a special message urging everyone to
remember the contribution of seafarers to
world trade and development.
“On the Day of the Seafarer, I urge
everyone to spare a thought for those
courageous seafarers, men and women
from all corners of the world, who face
danger and tough working conditions to
operate today’s complex, highly technical
ships, every hour of every day of the year –
and on whom we all depend,” he said

Wednesday, November 13, 2013

GL REQUIREMENTS FOR RO RO SHIPS



GL REQUIREMENTS FOR RO RO SHIPS. CLICK FOLLOWING SITE


http://www.gl-group.com/infoServices/rules/pdfs/gl_iv-11-1_e.pdf

MORE DETILS ABOUT RO-RO SHIPS

RO- RO SAFETY PART 2

A further important point made by the
dNV study was that the
ro-ro ships most frequently
exposed to serious casualties and total losses were the pure
ro-ro and freight-only types. Pure
ro-ros
had a high percentage share of all casualties and especially of total losses. Passenger ferries, on the
other hand, had a fairly high percentage share of all categories but the serious casualty/total loss
frequency was relatively low.
The study also showed that the total loss rate for
ro-ros was significantly
lower
than the
average for the world fleet (under 0.25% over the 13-year period compared with about 0.55% for the
world fleet).
A quick look at some of the best-known accidents involving
ro-ro ships
also indicates some
of the major problem areas. Several of them involved water getting on to the vehicle deck through
the cargo doors, either as a result of a mistake or an accident.
The first
ro-ro ship to be lost at sea was the
Princess Victoria,
a rail ferry which sank on a
voyage to Belfast in 1953 when heavy seas stove in the stern door: 133 lives were lost. At least 264
people died in 1966 when the Greek ferry
Heraklion
sank in heavy seas on a voyage to Piraeus.
Although not a
ro-ro, the ship did have a large car deck without
subdivisional bulkheads. This deck
flooded when
the loading hatch was smashed by a vehicle which had broken loose. The cargo
ro-ro
Hero
was lost in 1977, partly as a result of water entering through a leaking stern door. In September
1994 the passenger
ro-ro
Estonia
was lost with more than 900 lives when
the bow door was torn off
by heavy seas. The car deck flooded and the ship capsized within a few minutes (see page 20).
These accidents happened in heavy seas, but other
ro-ros have been lost through water
entering doors in port or sheltered waters.
They include the
Straitsman
,
which sank when the stern
door was opened as the ship approached land, with the crew unaware that the door sill was below the
waterline: and the
Seaspeed
Dora
, which capsized in 1977 when a movement of cargo caused the
ship to list sufficiently for water to enter through an open bunkering door. In the case of the
Herald
of Free Enterprise
, water entered through the bow door which had been left open (see page 13).
Ro-
ro
ships which have sunk rapidly as a result of a collision have included the
Jolly
Azzurro
(1978),
Collo
(1980),
Tollan
(1980),
Sloman Ranger
(1980),
Ems
(1981),
European Gateway
(
1983)
and
Mont Louis
(1984).
Among
ships which have been lost following a shift of cargo are the
Espresso
Sardegna
(1973),
Zenobia
(1980) and
Mekhanik
Tarasov
(1982, in very bad weather).

How safe are ro-ros?

How safe are
ro-ros?
Because of the publicity surrounding accidents involving passenger
ro-ro ships such as the
Herald of
Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star
and
Estonia
it is sometimes assumed that this type of ship is
much more dangerous
than others. This is not borne out by statistics. The World Casualty Statistics
for 1994 published by Lloyd's Register of Shipping show that passenger/
ro-
ro cargo loss rate per
thousand ships was 2.3 - the same as the average figure for all ships.
However, when one considers loss of life at sea the picture changes. Between 1989 and
1994, the Lloyd's Register figures show that 4,583 lives were lost in accidents at sea. Of these 1,544
were lost in accidents involving passenger/
ro-
ro cargo ships - exactly one third, even though
ro-ro
ships make up only a small fraction of world merchant marine tonnage. This would seem to indicate
that although passenger
ro-ro ships are involved in an
average number of accidents the
consequences of those accidents are usually far worse.
An important study concerning the safety of
ro-ro
ships (including cargo ships) was
submitted to IMO in 1983 by Norway. The study was compiled by the classification society
det
Norske
Veritas and covered the years 1965-1982. Of 341 casualties during the period, 217 were
defined as serious and 36 resulted in the total loss of the ship.
The study showed that the most common causes of serious casualties were collisions (24%);
machinery damage (17%): grounding (17%); shift of cargo and operational (16%); fire and explosion
(14%). The figures changed significantly when total losses were studied. Here the most common
cause was shift of cargo and operational faults (43%)
; collision (25%) and fire and explosion (18%).
The
dNV study showed that total losses as a result of a collision were much higher for
ro-ros
than for other ships (with only a 9% occurrence). Both collisions and uncontrolled shifts of cargo
more frequently led to serious consequences with
ro-ros.
The paper noted that more than 70% of all
ro-ro total losses due to collision resulted in loss
of lives while 60% of ships reported to have capsized or sunk following a collision did so in less than
ten minutes. Nearly all of the total losses involved ships of less than 110 metres in length.

RO-RO SHIP SAFETY

Focus on IMO
International Maritime Organization, 4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
E-mail:
rkohn@imo.org
or
nbrown@imo.org
Web site:
www.imo.org
IMO and
ro-ro safety
The roll-on/roll-off ship 1
is one of the most successful types operating today. Its flexibility
,
ability to
integrate with other transport systems and speed of operation have made
it extremely popular on
many shipping routes.
The roll-on/roll-off ship is defined in the November 1995 amendments to Chapter II-1 of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as being "a passenger ship
with
ro-ro cargo spaces or special category spaces..."
One of the
ro-ro ship's most important roles is as a passenger/car ferry, particularly on short-
sea routes. But despite its commercial success, the
ro-ro concept has always had its critics. There
have been disturbing accidents involving different types of
ro-ro ship, the worst being the sudden
and catastrophic capsizing of the passenger/car ferry
Herald of Free Enterprise
in March 1987 and
the even more tragic loss of the
Estonia
in September 1994.
This
paper looks at the background of
ro-ros, the problems involved and the way in which
IMO has endeavoured to tackle them.
The development of
ro-ros
The modern roll-on/roll-off ship can trace its origins back more than one hundred years to the early
days of the steam train. Ships were specially designed to take trains across rivers which were too
wide for bridges: the ships were equipped with rails, and the trains simply rolled straight on to the
ship, which sailed across the river to another rail berth where the train would roll off again. An
example is the Firth of Forth ferry in
Scotland which began operations in 1851.
It was not until the Second World War, however, that the idea of applying the
ro-ro principle
of road transport became practicable - and was used in constructing the tank landing craft used at D-
Day and in other battles.
The principle was applied to merchant ships in the late 1940s and early
1950s. It proved to be extremely popular, especially on short-sea ferry routes, encouraged by
technical developments on land as well as sea, notably the increase in road transport.
 
 
 Until the early 1950s someone wishing to
take his car from one country to another by sea had to get it loaded into the ship's hold by crane, a
time-consuming and expensive process. The development of the
ro-ro car ferry changed all that and
many ports boomed as a result.
In the United Kingdom, Dover's first pair of drive-on berths was opened in 1953. Until then
the port had handled only 10,000 crane-loaded cars each year and forecasts that the berths would
enable the port to handle ten times that many must have seemed decidedly optimistic. But the
100,000 figure was exceeded in the first year and by 1985 Dover was handling over 2.5 million
vehicles and units through nine
ro-ro berths. By 1994 the total had risen to more than 4.5 million.
By 1994 around 4,600
ro-ro ships were in operation around the world: They are particularly
popular in Europe, and trading patterns reflect this.
Whereas pure container ships are to be found in
large numbers operating between Europe and North America, Europe and Japan and Japan and North
America,
ro-ros
operate primarily between Europe and North America and Europe and the Middle
East, although there is an important trade between North America and the Caribbean.
Today the world
ro-ro fleet can be subdivided into a number of different types. They include
ships designed to carry freight vehicles only; to carry a combination of containers and freight
vehicles
and to transport cars without passengers. There are various other types and freight-only
ro-
ro ships form about two thirds of the world
ro-ro fleet at present.
However, the
best known
ro-ro ships are ferries designed to transport commercial vehicles
and private cars, together with large numbers of passengers, usually on short voyages.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

2002 passengership liability and compensation treaty


2002 passengership liability and
compensation treaty to enter into
force in 2014
The Athens Convention relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea, 2002, which substantially raises the                                                    
limits of liability for the death of, or personal
injury to, a passenger on a ship, is set to
enter into force on 23 April 2014, after the
required 10 ratifications were reached on 23
April 2013, with the ratification of the 2002
Athens Protocol by Belgium.
The 2002 Protocol to the Athens
Convention relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
1974, (PAL), revises and updates the 1974
Convention, which established a regime of
liability for damage suffered by passengers
carried on a seagoing vessel. As a
precondition for joining, Parties to the 2002
Protocol are required to denounce the 1974
treaty and its earlier Protocols.
The Athens Convention declares a
carrier liable for damage suffered by a
passenger resulting from death, personal
injury or damage to luggage if the incident
causing the damage occurred in the course
of the carriage and was due to the fault or
neglect of the carrier. Such fault or neglect
is presumed, unless the contrary is proved,
Carriers can limit their liability unless they
acted with intent to cause such damage,
or recklessly and with knowledge that such
damage would probably result. For the
death of, or personal injury to, a passenger,
this limit of liability was set at 46,666 Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) per carriage in the
1974 convention.
The 2002 Protocol substantially raises
those limits to 250,000 SDR per passenger
on each distinct occasion unless the carrier
proves that the incident resulted from an
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection
or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable and irresistible character; or was
wholly caused by an act or omission done
with the intent to cause the incident by a
third party.
If the loss exceeds this limit, the carrier is

further liable – up to a limit of 400,000 SDR
per passenger on each distinct occasion –                          
unless the carrier proves that the incident
which caused the loss occurred without the
fault or neglect of the carrier.
As far as loss of, or damage to, luggage
is concerned, the limit of the carrier’s liability
varies, depending on whether the loss
or damage occurred in respect of cabin
luggage, of a vehicle and/or luggage carried
in or on it, or in respect of other luggage.
•
The liability of the carrier for the loss of
or damage to cabin luggage is limited to
2,250 SDR per passenger, per carriage.
•
Liability of the carrier for the loss of or
damage to vehicles including all luggage
carried in or on the vehicle is limited
to12,700 SDR per vehicle, per carriage.
•
Liability of the carrier for the loss of or
damage to other luggage is limited to
3,375 SDR per passenger, per carriage.
The carrier and the passenger may agree
that the liability of the carrier shall be subject
to a deductible not exceeding 330 SDR in
the case of damage to a vehicle and not
exceeding 149 SDR per passenger in the
case of loss of or damage to other luggage,
such sum to be deducted from the loss or
damage.
The 2002 Athens Convention also
introduces compulsory insurance, as well
as mechanisms to assist passengers in
obtaining compensation, based on well-
accepted principles applied in existing
liability and compensation regimes dealin

with environmental pollution. These include
replacing the fault-based liability system with
a strict liability system for shipping-related
incidents, backed by the requirement that
the carrier take out compulsory insurance to
cover these potential claims.
Ships are to be issued with a certificate
attesting that insurance or other financial
security is in force and a model certificate is
attached to the Protocol in an Annex.
The limits contained in the Protocol set
a maximum limit, empowering – but not
obliging – national courts to compensate for
death, injury or damage up to these limits.
The Protocol also includes an “opt-out”
clause, enabling State Parties to retain
or introduce higher limits of liability (or
unlimited liability) in the case of carriers who
are subject to the jurisdiction of their courts.
The 2002 Protocol introduces a tacit
acceptance procedure for raising the
limits of liability, whereby a proposal to
amend the limits would be circulated on
the request of at least one-half of the
Parties to the Protocol, and adopted by a
two-thirds majority of the States Parties.
Amendments would then enter into force
within 36 months unless not less than one
fourth of the States Parties at the time of the
adoption informed that they did not accept
the amendment.
 
The 2002 PAL Protocol has now been
ratified by 10 States: Albania, Belgium,
Belize, Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Palau,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Serbia and Syrian
Arab Republic. It has been also ratified by
the European Union.
The 1974 convention has been ratified
by 35 States