Singapore has taken a significant step forward in the development of the practical operational procedures and standards for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) bunkering operations.

The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) and its appointed consultant, Lloyd’s Register, have completed its study on the Technical Standards and Procedures for LNG bunkering in the Port of Singapore. The study consolidated information that needs to be addressed before LNG bunkering can take place into five key areas as follow:

1.  LNG Bunkering Standards and Procedures within the Port’s limits
2. Technical Requirements and Specifications for LNG bunker tankers and receiving vessels with regard to transfer system, fittings and safety equipment
3. Safety Standards for LNG Bunkering operations
4. Identification of Safety Exclusion Zones and Emergency Procedures
5. Competency Standards for Personnel handling LNG bunkering

Following the completion of the study, MPA will be organising industry consultation sessions to share the results of the study with the maritime industry and seek their feedback. With the industry feedback, MPA will subsequently finalise the LNG bunkering standards for the Port of Singapore.
“There is an increasing need for the shipping industry to look at alternative sources of fuel and LNG is a promising option that we should consider. The completion of the study is an important milestone in the development of LNG bunkering in the Port of Singapore and we would like to share this significant progress with the industry” said Captain M Segar, MPA’s Assistant Chief Executive (Operations).
Singapore is recognised for its transparency and places a strong emphasis on the quality of bunkering services and safety standards. In 2012, the Port of Singapore recorded bunker sales volume of 42.7 million tonnes, retaining its position as the world’s top bunkering port. Singapore’s strong performance in bunker sales can be attributed to its strategic location at the crossroads of international trade and the industry structure that results in competitive bunker prices and assured quality and safety standards

MARITIME NEWS

The London P&I Club said that a recent analysis of collision cases has highlighted the effect which complacency on the bridge of the vessel can have on the incidence of casualties.

The club recently undertook a ‘root cause’ analysis of collision cases which concluded that the majority could be categorised as human error, with complacency often a significant contributing factor. In the latest issue of its StopLoss Bulletin, it cites the case of a bulk carrier which was approaching the end of a Traffic Separation Scheme. The ship was slowing to make an ETA at a pilot station in the adjacent Inshore Traffic Zone, and was soon to make a substantial alteration of course to starboard in accordance with its passage plan. At the same time, the vessel was being overtaken by a container ship. As a changeover of navigational watch was approaching, it became apparent to the Officer of the Watch (OOW) on the bulk carrier that the overtaking ship was not taking action to pass well clear in accordance with its obligations under Rule 13 of the Collision Regulations.

A VHF conversation took place in which the bulk carrier made its intentions known to the overtaking container ship, and an agreement was reached whereby the bulk carrier would make its alteration to starboard, and the overtaking ship would alter course to port and pass on the port side of the bulker. Shortly thereafter, the relieving officer arrived on the bridge of the bulk carrier and the watch handover process began. It was apparent that the OOW was confident that the plan was fully understood by both ships and expected the containership to pass on the port quarter. Unfortunately, he failed to monitor the situation, failed to alter course to starboard as agreed, and was taken by complete surprise in mid-conversation when the overtaking containership collided with the bulk carrier just forward of the bridge on the starboard side.
It was clear that, throughout the episode, the ships were in a developing close-quarters situation, and that good seamanship ought to have dictated that the OOW monitored the conduct of the overtaking ship very closely until it was finally past and clear, possibly delaying the watch-handover. The club says that misplaced complacency and over-confidence may have significantly contributed to the resulting collision claim.